​In his fusillade of executive actions, President Donald Trump sent letters demanding the resignations of Sharon Bradford Franklin, Chair of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB), along with her two Democratic colleagues. If they don’t leave, then in his trademark style the president will say, “You’re fired!”
 
We suggest that the president think twice. The new administration is clearing out the very people who could be natural allies of President Trump in one key regard – exposing the misuse of intelligence programs. This includes abuses of some of the very programs that were used against Donald Trump in the past.
 
By law, the program must have members from both parties. With the Democrats fired and a preexisting Republican vacancy, PCLOB would have only one remaining member, Republican Beth A. Williams. Without a quorum, PCLOB would effectively not exist. At least two of the Democrats – Chair Franklin and Travis LeBlanc – have been outspoken skeptics of the intelligence agencies and the surveillance status quo.
 
PCLOB is the only watchdog agency tasked with ensuring that the intelligence community and its programs respect Americans’ rights and freedoms. Its stated mission is “working to ensure that efforts by the executive branch to protect the nation from terrorism appropriately safeguard privacy and civil liberty.” Such a watchdog could be a strong ally to a Director of National Intelligence like Tulsi Gabbard and an FBI Director like Kash Patel in exposing surveillance abuses by the intelligence community.
 
Firing the sitting Democrats will lead to one of two outcomes. It will either null out a privacy watchdog that could help the administration’s agenda curb the “deep state.” Or the agency will be refloated with a new quorum that – under its legal charter – must include two new Democrats, who might be a lot less friendly to the Trump surveillance reform agenda.
 
The Trump Administration is off to a commendably brisk start. We respectfully suggest that this decision get a second look.

​A public report from the secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) gives the intelligence community a mixed review, noting progress in meeting its own internal quality standards while revealing violations and abuses as well.
 
The court reviewed compliance by the FBI, NSA, and CIA with “minimization” and “querying” procedures under Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), which authorizes spying on foreign targets located on foreign soil. In plain English, minimization means restricting access to the private data or communications of Americans that are caught up in the NSA’s global trawl, which frequently collects non-pertinent conversations that lack intelligence or evidentiary value. Querying standards direct agents to use precise search terms in an effort to avoid capturing Americans’ communications. Throughout, the government purports to earnestly verify the “foreign-ness” of a target.
 

• A chart shows that tightened FBI training has resulted in radically reduced errors in its query standards. In the first three months of 2022, out of 3,614 queries, the FBI failed to meet its standard in 952 of them, or 26 percent. In a two-month period in 2023, out of 3,506 queries, the FBI failed to meet its internal standards in 10 of them, or 0.3 percent. We should realize, however, that when the FBI evaluates its adherence to its own standards, it is giving itself a grade.

 
Given that the court previously revealed that past queries violated the privacy of a U.S. Senator, a U.S. House Member, 19,000 donors to a federal candidate, a state senator, and a state judge, even small numbers could be hiding a lot. However tight the querying standard, warrantless searches can also still be used by the FBI to develop evidence for purely domestic cases, a source that might not be disclosed in open court.
 

• The report revealed that at least five FBI agents in four field offices routinely used a bypass in their queries to avoid entering justifications for their searches or answering prompts requiring the reasons for the search. The Justice Department’s National Security Division was told that these bypasses were routinely used by these agents. The FBI informed the court that it had not “discovered any indications that the FBI personnel who engaged in this method were motivated by an intent to circumvent the query requirements.” What did these agents believe that the computer system’s justification prompts were for?

 

• Despite the government’s purported dedication to its minimization standards, it stores information in a non-minimized format by default. “In general, analysts can search databases containing unminimized information acquired pursuant to Section 702 using one or more search terms to discover and retrieve information of interest.” How this process adheres to overall minimization procedures is hard to understand – a good question for Congress to explore.

 
As one moves through this report into NSA and CIA activities, the redactions often fill half a page.
 

• Reading (literally) between the lines, the NSA between July 2021 and April 2023 suffered a software error that undermined its privacy assurances to the FISC. Noting that “this situation raises concerns,” the FISC revealed that “the government took until February 2024 to report the circumstances to the court,” despite a rule that “requires immediate notification when the government discovers that it has made a material misstatement or omission or implemented a FISC authorization in a noncompliant manner.”

 

• The court also found it necessary in this report to order that raw upstream data (taken from major internet cables and switches) will not be provided to the FBI, CIA, and the National Counter Terrorism Center without first being subjected to new minimization procedures. The scope of this remedy suggests a widespread problem of noncompliance.

 

• Finally, and perhaps most ominously, the CIA notified the court that it has a “new capability” that is “intended to help CIA personnel review large volumes of data efficiently.” This is almost certainly the application of artificial intelligence to global data collected under Section 702. The court found the application of this technology to not be a query under current statutes. Given the intermixing of American and foreign data, this is a hard judgment to trust, given the deep aperture of AI and its wide-ranging analytical capability.

 
In sum, the FISC report signed by federal judge Anthony J. Trenga gives us a glimpse of a federal intelligence bureaucracy struggling to comply with the law and its own standards, while still suffering from lapses too serious to paper over.

​For days after the arrest of Telegram CEO Pavel Durov by French authorities at Le Bourget Airport near Paris, the world civil liberties community held back.
 
The impulse to rush to the defense of a Russian dissident/entrepreneur was almost overwhelming. Durov had refined his skills with the creation of VK, a social media website that allowed dissidents, opposition politicians, and Ukrainian protesters to evade Vladimir Putin’s emerging surveillance state as late as 2014. After Durov fled Russia with his brother Nikolai, they created the encrypted messenger service Telegram, which allows users not only to communicate in secrecy, but to also set their messages to disappear.
 
Across Asia, Africa, Latin America, and our own country, Telegram enables dissidents, journalists, and people in fear of cartels or abusive spouses to communicate without making themselves vulnerable. So civil libertarians were naturally poised to rush to Durov’s defense. But they didn’t. There was the matter of the 12 charges approved by a French judge this week, including “complicity” in crimes such as aiding in the distribution of international narcotics and child sex abuse material.
 
The many devils in this case lurk in its many details, some of which are far from well understood. At this point, however, we can at least pose preliminary questions. Some answers must come from the French government. Some must come from every person who cares about privacy, including the almost 1 billion users of Telegram.

1. Telegram has a service that offers unencrypted, custom chat rooms and one-way broadcast channels that can accommodate up to 200,000 users. Was it in these semi-public channels that the French government alleges the criminal conduct took place?
   
   
2. Did Durov and his people monitor these large chat rooms and channels? If they did not, perhaps out of a matter of principle, does that exculpate them to any degree?  
   ​
   
3. The value of an encrypted messaging service is its security. The provision of a backdoor by Telegram to any government would necessarily result in the compromise of Telegram’s value to some of the most endangered and vulnerable people in the world. But the flip side of this is that with an encrypted service there may be no way for even Durov himself to know the content of the messages crossing his servers. Should such hands-off, deliberate ignorance absolve Durov & Co. from criminal liability?

 
We can already highlight at least one aspect of this case that should concern civil libertarians and free speech advocates around the world. Thanks to an insightful analysis by Kevin Collier and Rob Wile in Slate, we know that two of the 12 charges involve a purported obligation of providers of cryptological services to require their users to register with their real identities. Another count declares it a crime to import such an encrypted service “without prior declaration.”
 
Collier and Wile write that this latter provision, which at first sounds like a matter of bureaucratic form-filling, actually implies that “France sees the use of internationally based, unregulated ‘encryption’ service as a crime all its own.” If so, will France get away with criminalizing private encryption services? And if that happens, might this become EU policy?
 
We are already seeing Europe employ illiberal interpretations of the recently enacted Digital Services Act. The EU’s top digital regulator, Thierry Breton, threatened X with legal action if it ran Elon Musk’s full interview with Donald Trump. While Breton’s threat was later disowned by his boss, EU President Ursula von der Leyen, it was still breathtaking to see in Europe today that a powerful regulator believes the European public would be well served by censoring the words of a major party nominee to lead the United States. It is not a stretch to imagine such people also wanting to stamp out private communications. Is France now using possibly legitimate charges about Telegram’s operation to undermine the very idea of encryption?
 
Everyone who cares about privacy should watch how this case unfolds. After all, thanks to Telegram, we know that there are at least one billion of us.

PPSA's senior policy advisor, Bob Goodlatte, and general counsel, Gene Schaerr, explain in Just Security on why it’s imperative that intel agencies listen to bipartisan concerns re: surveillance reform. Surveillance abuses degrade and threaten the vital mission these agencies must carry out. Additionally, they explain how the intel agencies' alienation of Americans and congressional representatives is dangerous for both the Constitution and national security.

​PPSA today announced the filing of a lawsuit to compel the FBI to produce records about the possible use of FISA Section 702 authority – enacted by Congress to enable surveillance of foreign targets on foreign soil – for political surveillance of Americans at home.
 
Activists on the left and the right have long suspected the FBI uses surreptitious means to spy on lawful protests and speech. Those suspicions were confirmed when a FISA court decision released in 2022 revealed that government investigators had used Section 702 global database to surveil all 19,000 donors to a single Congressional campaign.
 
Acting on this concern, PPSA submitted a FOIA request to the FBI in February seeking all records discussing the use of Section 702 or other FISA authorities to surveil, collect information related to, or otherwise investigate anyone who attended:
 

• President Trump’s “Save America Rally” on January 6, 2021

 

• Black Lives Matter Protests and other BLM events in Washington, D.C., in 2021

 
The FBI almost immediately responded to PPSA that our FOIA request “is not searchable” in the FBI’s “indices.” The response also informed us that the FBI “administratively closed” our request. The FBI did not dispute that PPSA’s FOIA request reasonably described the requested records. This should have, under the FOIA statute, triggered a search requirement, but the FBI ignored it. The self-serving excuse that limitations to the FBI’s Central Records System overlooks the plentiful databases and search methods at the fingertips of one of the world’s premier investigative organizations.
 
After a fruitless appeal to the Department of Justice’s Office of Information Policy, exhausting any administrative remedy, PPSA is now suing in the U.S. District Court of the District of Columbia to compel the FBI to produce these documents. We’ll keep you informed of any major developments.

​We needed a little perspective before reporting on the historic showdown on the reauthorization of FISA Section 702 that ended on April 19 with a late-night Senate vote. The bottom line: The surveillance reform coalition finally made it to the legislative equivalent of the Super Bowl. We won’t be taking home any Super Bowl rings, but we made a lot of yardage and racked up impressive touchdowns.
 
For years, PPSA has coordinated with a wide array of leading civil liberties organizations across the ideological spectrum toward that key moment. We worked hard and enjoyed the support of our followers in flooding Congress with calls and emails supporting privacy and surveillance reform.
 
So what was the result? We failed to get a warrant requirement for Section 702 data but came within one vote of winning it in the House. There was a lot of good news and new reforms that should not be overlooked. And where the news was bad, there are silver linings that gleam.

• Best of all – and the intelligence community hates this – we succeeded in reducing the deadline for the next reauthorization of Section 702 from five years to two. We also got the date of reauthorization moved from the end of the year, when legislative priorities tend to get lost in the press of late business, to April in even (election) years.

 

• An important reform amendment from Rep. Chip Roy (R-TX) passed. The FBI will now be under a microscope, with quarterly reports to Congress on the number of time the FBI searches, “or queries,” the communications of Americans in Section 702 databases. It also allows the leaders of both Houses of Congress and the House and Senate Judiciary and Intelligence Committees to attend hearings of the secret FISA Court.

 

• The worst event of this round was that the “Make Everyone a Spy” amendment passed. Signed into law by President Biden, this measure allows the government to force a wide range of small businesses to help the NSA in its spying, and it gags them to prevent them from revealing it. This measure passed only after a pinkie promise from Attorney General Merrick Garland to enforce it narrowly. Sen. Mark Warner, Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, said he would support revising the bill’s vague language. Our coalition will closely watch the Department of Justice and take up Sen. Warner’s promise to tighten the language of this amendment. We will hold them to account.

 

• Thanks to an amendment offered by Rep. Ben Cline (R-VA), we permanently ended “abouts” collection – the practice of surveilling Americans who are merely mentioned in a communication.

 

• We secured dozens of reforms of the FISA process for both Section 702 and Title I surveillance, including:

 

• The FBI can no longer rely on press reports or political opposition research to seek surveillance orders from the secret FISA Court.

 

• The numbers of FBI personnel who can make Section 702 queries has been massively reduced, with independent audits of every U.S. person query.

 

• FBI agents who lie to the FISA Court will be fired or suspended without pay. Leaking a secret FISA application will result in 10 years in prison and or a $250,000 fine. FBI personnel who lie to the FISA Court – as FBI lawyer Kevin Clinesmith did when he altered a document about Carter Page and submitted it as evidence – will face 10 years in prison and/or a $250,000 fine.

 

• Soon after the Section 702 debate, the House passed The Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act on a strong bipartisan 219-199 vote. This bill requires the FBI and other federal agencies to obtain a warrant before they can purchase Americans’ personal data, including internet records and location histories. Passage in the House gives a mark of validation to this bill, making it easier for the bill’s Senate champions to enlist their colleagues to support it.

 
We come out of this legislative fracas bloodied but energized. We put together a durable left-right coalition in which House Judiciary Committee Chairman Jim Jordan and Ranking Member Jerry Nadler, as well as the heads of the Freedom and Progressive caucuses, who worked side-by-side. For the first time, our surveillance coalition had the intelligence community and their champions on the run. We lost the warrant provision for Section 702 only by a tie vote. Had every House Member who supported our position been in attendance, we would have won. This bodes well for the next time Section 702 reauthorization comes up.
 
We will be ready.
 
Let’s not forget that a recent bipartisan YouGov poll shows that 80 percent of Americans support warrant requirements. We sense a gathering of momentum – and we look forward to preparing for the next big round in April 2026.

​The House voted 219-199 to pass the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act, which requires the FBI and other federal agencies to obtain a warrant before they can purchase Americans’ personal data, including internet records and location histories.
 
“Every American should celebrate this strong victory in the House of Representatives today,” said Bob Goodlatte, former House Judiciary Chairman and PPSA Senior Policy Advisor. “We commend the House for stepping up to protect Americans from a government that asserts a right to purchase the details of our daily lives from shady data brokers. This vote serves notice on the government that a new day is dawning. It is time for the intelligence community to respect the will of the American people and the authority of the Fourth Amendment.”
 
Federal agencies, from the FBI to the IRS, ATF, and the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security, for years have purchased Americans’ sensitive, personal information scraped from apps and sold by data brokers. This practice is authorized by no specific statute, nor conducted under any judicial oversight.
 
“The Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act puts an end to the peddling of Americans’ private lives to the government,” said Gene Schaerr, general counsel of PPSA. “Eighty percent of the American people in a recent YouGov poll say they believe warrants are absolutely necessary before their digital lives can be reviewed by the government. It is now the duty of the U.S. Senate to finish the job and express the will of the people.”
 
PPSA is grateful to Rep. Warren Davidson, House Judiciary Chairman Jim Jordan, Ranking Member Jerry Nadler, Reps. Andy Biggs, Rep. Pramila Jayapal, Rep. Zoe Lofgren, Rep. Thomas Massie, Rep. Sara Jacobs, and many others who worked to persuade Members to pass this bill in such a strong bipartisan victory.
 
Much of the credit also goes to PPSA’s followers, thousands of whom called and emailed Members of the House at a critical time.
 
“We will need you again when the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act goes to the Senate,” Schaerr said. “Stay tuned.”

When Members of the House voted last week to reauthorize FISA Section 702, most did not realize that an amendment from the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), sold as a “narrow” definitional change to the law, will actually deliver what Sen. Ron Wyden (D-OR) calls “one of the most dramatic and terrifying expansions of government surveillance authority in history.”
 
What the House missed the Senate can still fix. The Senate still has time to perform emergency surgery and excise this particularly toxic amendment.
 
Here’s the background: For years, “electronic communications service providers” such as Verizon or Google’s Gmail have been required to turn over the communications of targets. The House bill expands this requirement to enlist millions of small businesses that provide Wi-Fi or have access to routers or similar communications equipment. This provision would make American small businesses into providers of KGB-like surveillance.
 
If this seems hyperbolic, consider that this HPSCI amendment would force American small businesses of many sorts to collect the communications of their customers for the government. The bill does this by including any service provider who has access to equipment that transmits communications. The language was narrowed to exclude hotels, restaurants, dwellings, and community centers, but the measure still includes most businesses – owners and operators of any facilities that house equipment used to store or carry data, including data centers and commercial office buildings.
 
Millions of Americans, with little or no knowledge of the equipment they own or service –landlords, utility providers, repairmen, plumbers, cleaning contractors, and similar professionals – would have a legal obligation to secretly spy for the government. Lacking any ability to separate the communications of Americans from foreigners, they would be forced either to give the government direct access to the equipment or copy its messages en masse and turn it over. And then they would be under a gag order to keep their snooping a secret.
 
This version of Section 702 reauthorization would be a disaster for small businesses of all sorts. Bound to silence, small businesses would suffer consumer distrust as public knowledge of the contamination of the data supply chain spread. Consumers and business would have no recourse. This bill also marks a terrifying replacement of the constitutional order under the Fourth Amendment.
 
For these reasons, the Senate must do its duty and remove it.

​The Senate is on the verge of voting on the House-passed Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act (RISAA), which includes a toxic provision people are calling the “Everyone’s a Spy” Amendment.
 
This amendment would compel millions of small businesses and corporations that have access to routers, Wi-Fi, or other ordinary communications equipment to turn over their customers’ data to the government.
 
Tell your Senators:
 
“Please remove the toxic ‘Everyone’s a Spy’ Amendment in the FISA surveillance bill that just passed the House.”

​An amendment to require the FBI and other federal agencies to obtain a probable cause warrant before accessing Americans’ communications under FISA Section 702 fell one vote short in the U.S. House of Representatives on Friday.
 
This was a disappointment, made worse by an expansion of the government’s surveillance powers contained in the bill. The House vote includes a change in the definition of an electronic communication service provider to require a whole new range of businesses to assist the government in its spying.
 
But there was also good news.
 
Pressure from reformers did succeed in changing Section 702 reauthorization from five years to two years. The House also passed a measure from Rep. Chip Roy (R-TX) that requires the FBI to give Congress a quarterly report on the number of U.S. person queries conducted. The combination of a shorter period before the next reauthorization and the strengthened oversight of the FBI should serve notice on the FBI and other agencies not to return to their lax treatment of Americans’ privacy and constitutional rights.
 
Reform received another win on Friday with the passage of an amendment sponsored by Rep. Ben Cline (R-VA) that makes permanent the suspended intelligence practice of “abouts” collection, in which Americans were targeted for merely being mentioned in a communications. Abuse of “abouts” collection prompted the FISA Court to publicly excoriate the National Security Agency for an “institutional lack of candor” about a “very serious Fourth Amendment issue.”
 
PPSA joins our civil liberties peers in calling on the Senate to reject any reauthorization that continues Section 702 programs without a warrant requirement for Americans. A recent YouGov poll shows that almost 80 percent of Americans support the warrant requirement. The signals for reform are growing stronger – the American people and a growing coalition in Congress have had enough of Washington’s surveillance abuse.

​The reauthorization of FISA Section 702, which allows federal agencies to conduct international surveillance for national security purposes, has languished in Congress like an old Spanish galleon caught in the doldrums. This happened after opponents of reform pulled Section 702 reauthorization from the House floor rather than risk losing votes on popular measures, such as requiring government agencies to obtain warrants before surveilling Americans’ communications.
 
But the winds are no longer becalmed. They are picking up – and coming from the direction of reform.
 
Sen. Dick Durbin (D-IL), Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, and fellow committee member Sen. Mike Lee (R-UT), today introduced the Security and Freedom Enhancement (SAFE) Act. This bill requires the government to obtain warrants or court orders before federal agencies can access Americans’ personal information, whether from Section 702-authorized programs or purchased from data brokers.
 
Enacted by Congress to enable surveillance of foreign targets in foreign lands, Section 702 is used by the FBI and other federal agencies to justify domestic spying. According to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Court, under Section 702 government “batch” searches have included a sitting U.S. Congressman, a U.S. Senator, journalists, political commentators, a state senator, and a state judge who reported civil right violations by a local police chief to the FBI. It has even been used by government agents to stalk online romantic prospects.
 
Millions of Americans in recent years have had their communications compromised by programs under Section 702. The reforms of the SAFE Act promise to reverse this trend, protecting Americans’ privacy and constitutional rights from the government. The SAFE Act requires:

• Intelligence agencies to obtain an order from the FISA Court or a court order before accessing the contents of Americans’ communications collected under Section 702. In a nod to efficiency, warrants need not be obtained before the government runs queries of the data base. Given that less than 2 percent of Section 702 queries actually return results, this narrow requirement will greatly reduce the number of cases in which government agents must seek a warrant, leaving them free to focus on foreign intelligence for national security.

 

• Generally prohibits collection of Americans’ purchased data. Federal agencies currently purchase Americans’ most sensitive, personal information – revealing details about our health, finances, romantic lives, religious worship, and political activities – from data brokers, without any specific statutory authorization. Intelligence agencies make up their own rules for these purchases of our information, without accounting for how and why they use it. The SAFE Act allows agencies to collect Americans’ data when it cannot be separated from other data purchases, but such data must be treated under minimization procedures. The bill otherwise closes this “data broker loophole” by requiring the government to get a court order to collect Americans’ data.

 

• Strengthens the role of highly credentialed experts in privacy law as advisors to the FISA Court. People targeted by a surveillance request by the Department of Justice before this secret court are not represented – and are usually unaware – that they are targets. Such an amicus curiae would ensure that a legal expert with high-level security clearance would advise the court on the privacy and constitutional implications of surveillance requests.

 

• Adds additional training for FBI personnel conducting Section 702 queries, while also requiring more managerial oversight of their queries, as well as audits, and regular reports of Section 702 activities to Congress. The Durbin-Lee bill requires approval from the FBI Deputy Director for any query involving a U.S. elected official, a U.S. state or political appointee, a U.S. political organization, or a member of such an organization. Similar approvals would be required involving religious organizations in any batch query. In this way, Durbin-Lee protects the First Amendment rights of how people vote, serve in office, and worship.

 

• Strengthens the prohibition of “reverse targeting,” in which foreign surveillance can be used as a pretext to work backwards to justify spying on a domestic target.

 

• Repeals the practice of “abouts” collection, currently suspended, in which the NSA collects second-hand mentions of a targeted person, rather than the communications of that actual person.

 

• Imposes criminal penalties for knowingly submitting false information, or omitting relevant information, to the FISA Court. In the infamous Carter Page case, an FBI attorney gave the court a doctored document. Durbin-Lee would make the deliberate misleading of a court a specific crime.

 
Durbin-Lee is a pragmatic bill. It lifts warrants and other requirements in emergency circumstances. The SAFE Act allows the government to obtain consent for surveillance if the subject of the search is a potential victim or target of a foreign plot. It allows queries designed to identify targets of cyberattacks, where the only content accessed and reviewed is malicious software or cybersecurity threat signatures.
 
The SAFE Act is a good-faith effort to strike a balance between national security and Americans’ privacy. It should break the current stalemate, renewing the push for debate and votes on amendments to the reauthorization of Section 702.

​Time and again, the forces of the surveillance status quo have prevented Congress from voting on reforms of FISA Section 702 – the authority passed by Congress to allow the government to track foreign threats but has been used in recent years to surveil millions of ordinary Americans.
 
The intelligence community especially doesn’t want Congress to demand closure of the loophole that allows the government to purchase your most sensitive and personal information from data brokers. Federal agencies can use this data to accumulate a portfolio of your health and medical issues, personal life, financial concerns, religious beliefs and worship, and political posts and activities.
 
Repeated attempts by the U.S. House of Representatives to debate and hold a floor vote on these reform amendments to Section 702 have been stalled by legislative maneuvers and gamesmanship. At the same time, the government has applied to the FISA Court to extend Section 702 without reforms for a whole year, which could elbow Congress out of the policy process entirely.
 
While Congress struggles, a poll conducted by YouGov, commissioned by FreedomWorks and DemandProgress, show the American people – Republicans, Democrats, and independents – are paying attention and they do not like what they see:
​

• Eighty percent of Americans agree that Congress should require government agencies to obtain a warrant before purchasing location information, internet records, and other sensitive data about people in the U.S. from data brokers.

 

• Seventy-six percent agree that government agencies should be required to obtain warrants before intentionally searching international communications for conversations involving people in the U.S.

In the reauthorization of Section 702, Americans demand that Congress:

• Close the loophole that allows international surveillance to become a platform to surveil Americans.

 

• Close the loophole that allows government to purchase our sensitive, personal information from data brokers.

Members of Congress are now asking themselves: If I allow these domestic surveillance programs to continue, how am I going to explain this my constituents? You can help clarify this issue for your Member of Congress.
 
Tell your U.S. House Representative:
 
“Stop the FBI and other government agencies from spying on innocent Americans. Please fight for a vote to reform FISA’s Section 702 with warrant requirements, both for Section 702 data and for our sensitive, personal information sold to the government by data brokers.”

​PPSA, in concert with a coalition of major civil liberties groups from the left, right, and center, is appealing to Members of Congress “to oppose any legislative end-run that allows the FBI and other intelligence agencies to continue to spy on Americans without giving Congress the opportunity to vote on reforms.”
 
The word from Capitol Hill is that the intelligence community is now lobbying to attach a reauthorization of FISA Section 702 to a “must-pass” spending measure. Such a maneuver would cement the intelligence community’s strategy of denying Members of Congress a chance to have a debate and to vote on reforms to this surveillance authority.
 
Our letter, which includes Americans for Prosperity, the Brennan Center for Justice, Demand Progress, FreedomWorks, and the Wikimedia Foundation, warns Congress:
 
“The Fourth Amendment will become a constitutional dead letter if the government can continue to track our every movement, communications, where we worship, our financial and health issues, what we believe, and our political activity without warrants.”
 
Our letter concludes: “Congress must be able to vote on reforms rather than being faced with a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ choice between funding the government and protecting Americans’ liberties.”
 
Our FISA Reform Coalition letter ended by urging Congress to stand up for Americans’ privacy, the Constitution, and against the insulting premise that Members of Congress should not be allowed to vote on surveillance reform.

​From Gene Schaerr, general counsel of the Project for Privacy and Surveillance Accountability:
 
“For months, the House Intelligence Committee warned that failure to reauthorize Section 702 would subject the American homeland to unprecedented danger. 
 
“Now the Intelligence Committee has caused the bill to be pulled rather than allow the House to work its will and vote on a few reasonable and important reform amendments. 
 
“They are now willing to endanger Section 702 in its entirety unless they get everything they want.
 
“Think about it – the intelligence community and deep state are so determined to maintain the ability to spy on Americans that they are willing to put at risk the very authority they claim they need to protect us against foreign threats.”

​“Once again, the House has passed the Protect Reporters from Exploitive State Spying (PRESS) Act with unanimous, bipartisan support. Forty-nine states have press shield laws protecting journalists and their sources from the prying eyes of prosecutors. The federal government does not. From Fox News to The New York Times, government has surveilled journalists in order to catch their sources. Journalists have been held in contempt and even jailed for bravely safeguarding the trust of their sources.
 
“The PRESS Act corrects this by granting a privilege to protect confidential news sources in federal legal proceedings, while offering reasonable exceptions for extreme situations. Such laws work well for the states and would safeguard Americans’ right to evaluate claims of secret wrongdoing for themselves.
 
“Great credit goes to Rep. Kevin Kiley and Rep. Jamie Raskin for lining up bipartisan support for this reaffirmation of the First Amendment. As in 2022, the last time the House passed this act, the duty now shifts to the U.S. Senate to respond to this display of unanimous, bipartisan support. I am optimistic. At a time of gridlock, enacting this bill into law would be a positive message that would reflect well on every Senator.”

​Late last week, Judge Rudolph Contreras ordered the NSA, the CIA, the FBI, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to respond to a PPSA Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request. The government now has two weeks to schedule the production of “policy documents” regarding the intelligence community’s acquisition and use of commercially available information regarding 145 current and former Members of Congress.
 
This is the second time Judge Contreras has had to tell federal agencies to respond to a FOIA request PPSA submitted. In late 2022, Judge Contreras rejected in part the FBI’s insistence that the Glomar doctrine allowed it to ignore FOIA’s requirement to search for responsive records. Despite that clear holding, the FBI – joined this time by several other agencies – again refused to search for records in response to PPSA’s FOIA request. And Judge Contreras had to remind the agencies again that FOIA’s search obligations cannot be ducked so easily. 
 
Instead, Judge Contreras found that PPSA “logically and plausibly” requested the policy documents about the acquisition of commercially available information. And Judge Contreras concluded that a blanket Glomar response, in which the government neither confirms nor denies the existence of the requested documents, is appropriate only when a Glomar response is justified for all categories of responsive records.
 
The judge then described a hypothetical letter from a Member of Congress to the NSA that clarifies the distinction between operational and policy documents. He considered that such a letter might ask if the NSA “had purchased commercially available information on any of the listed Senators or Congresspeople” without revealing whether the NSA (or any other of the defendant agencies) “had a particular interest in surveilling the individual.” Judge Contreras decided that “it is difficult to see how a document such as this would reveal sensitive information about Defendants’ intelligence activities, sources, or methods.”
 
It is on this reasoning that the judge ordered these agencies to produce these policies documents. We eagerly awaits the delivery of these documents in both cases. Stay tuned.

​PPSA today announced that it is asking the District Court for the District of Columbia to force the FBI to produce two records about communications between government agencies and Members of Congress concerning their possible “unmasking” in secretly intercepted foreign conversations under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).
 
PPSA’s request to the court involves the practice of naming Americans – in this case, Members of the House and Senate – who are caught up in foreign surveillance summaries. In 2017, Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC) said he had reason to believe his identify had been unmasked and that he had written to the FBI about it. Similar statements have been made by other Members of Congress of both parties.
 
The matter seemed to have been settled in October 2022 when Judge Rudolph Contreras of the U.S. District Court of the District of Columbia declared that “communications between the FBI and Congress are a degree removed from FISA-derived documents and which discuss congressional unmasking as a matter of legislative interest, policy, or oversight … the FBI must conduct a search for any ‘policy documents’ in its possession.”
 
The FBI had first refused to release these documents under a broad and untenable interpretation of the Glomar doctrine, under which the government asserts it can neither confirm nor deny the existence of such records for national security reasons. After Judge Contreras swept that excuse away, the FBI in October 2023 asserted that three FOIA exemptions allow it to withhold requested documents.
 
The FBI has gone from obfuscation to outright defiance of the plain text of the law. It still claims that releasing correspondence with Congress would, somehow, endanger intelligence sources and methods. It is time for the court to step in and issue a legal order the FBI cannot openly defy.
 
Thus PPSA’s cross motion for summary judgment knocks down the FBI’s rationale and asks Judge Contreras to order the FBI to produce all FBI records reflecting communications between the government and Members of Congress on their “unmasking.”  
 
Earlier, the FBI had searched under a court order to find two relevant policy documents. These unreleased records include a four-page email between FBI employees and an FBI Intelligence Program Policy Guide. Significant portions of both documents are being withheld by the FBI because, the Bureau now asserts, of the three exemptions. It claims the disclosure can be withheld because it could implicate sources and methods, the records were created for law enforcement purposes, and because of confidentiality.
 
None of these excuses meet the laugh test for correspondence with Members of Congress. PPSA is optimistic the court will end the FBI’s two years of foot-dragging and order it to produce.

​In July, we wrote about revelations that the U.S. Department of Justice subpoenaed Google for the private data of House Intel staffers looking into the origins of the FBI’s Russiagate investigation. Then, in October, we wrote about a FOIA request from Empower Oversight seeking documents shedding light on the extent to which the executive branch is spying on Members of Congress. Now, following the launch of an official inquiry, Rep. Jim Jordan has issued a subpoena to Attorney General Merrick Garland for further information on the DOJ’s efforts to surveil Congress and congressional staff.
 
On Halloween, Jordan launched his inquiry into the DOJ’s apparent attempts to spy on Congress, sending letters to the CEOs of Alphabet, Apple, AT&T, T-Mobile, and Verizon requesting, for example, “[a]ll documents and communications between or among Apple employees and Justice Department employees referring or relating to subpoenas or requests issued by the Department of Justice to Apple for personal or official records or communications of Members of Congress or congressional staff….”
 
Jordan also sent a letter to Garland, asserting that “[t]he Justice Department’s efforts to obtain the private communications of congressional staffers, including staffers conducting oversight of the Department, is wholly unacceptable and offends fundamental separation of powers principles as well as Congress’s constitutional authority to conduct oversight of the Justice Department.”
 
Nearly two months later, according to Jordan, the DOJ’s response has been insufficient. In a letter to Garland dated December 19, 2023, Jordan says that the “Committee must resort to compulsory process” due to “the Department’s inadequate response to date.”
 
That response, to be fair, did include a letter to Jordan dated December 4 conveying that the legal process used related to an investigation “into the unauthorized disclosure of classified information in a national media publication. Jordan, citing news reports, contends that the investigation actually “centered on FISA warrants obtained by the Justice Department on former Trump campaign associate Carter Page” (which the Justice Department Inspector General faulted for “significant inaccuracies and omissions”).
 
Whatever the underlying motivation, Jordan is right to find DOJ’s explanation to date unsatisfying. Spying on Congress not only brings with it tremendous separation of powers concerns but raises a broader question about FISA and other processes that would reveal Americans’ personal information without sufficient predication. 
 
We need answers. Who authorized these DOJ subpoenas? And how can we make sure this kind of thing doesn’t happen again? PPSA looks forward to further developments in this story.

​With Congress extending the reauthorization of FISA Section 702 until April, the debate over surveillance can be expected to fire up again when Members return in January. As Members relax and reorient over the holidays, we urge them to take a moment to listen to what the American people are saying.
 
The conservative FreedomWorks and the progressive Demand Progress, both highly respected advocacy organizations with deep grassroots, came together to conduct a national poll on the public’s approval of specific measures. Some of these measures are in the FISA Reform and Reauthorization Act passed by the House Intelligence Committee, and some in the Protect Liberty and End Warrantless Surveillance Act, passed 35-2 by the House Judiciary Committee.
 
Across the board, Americans overwhelmingly support the provisions in the Protect Liberty Act.
​

• 78 percent support Congress strengthening privacy protections (in Protect Liberty Act, but not in the FISA "Reform" and Reauthorization Act).
  
  
• 76 percent support Congress requiring a warrant before Americans' international communications are searched by government agencies (in Protect Liberty Act, but not in the FISA “Reform” and Reauthorization Act).
  
  
• 80 percent support Congress requiring a warrant before purchasing Americans’ location and internet records from data brokers (in Protect Liberty Act, but not in the FISA "Reform" and Reauthorization Act. 

 
House Judiciary Chairman Jim Jordan, writing in The Wall Street Journal, declared that, “in the wake of serious FISA abuses, our fidelity must be to the Constitution, not the surveillance state.” The FreedomWorks/Demand Progress poll shows that the American people agree.

Gene Schaerr, PPSA's General Counsel, explains how the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence's bill on FISA's Section 702 would actually expand warrantees surveillance. 

​"But the House Intelligence bill’s expansion to include “equipment” would cover, for example, any small or medium-sized business that simply provides Wi-Fi or stores data. This means that your business landlord, Airbnb host, hotel manager, or coffee shop barista will have a legal obligation to give the government any of your emails, texts, or phone metadata that ran through their equipment. Larger entities, such as data centers, would also be enlisted in spying on Americans."

“There would be eyes everywhere,” is how the Brennan Center’s Elizabeth Goitein reacted to a provision in the FISA Reform and Reauthorization Act (FRRA), a House Intelligence bill that would widen the trawl of digital collection of Americans’ information.
 
Section 504 of the FRRA would target businesses far outside of the tech sector that are not communications companies. By widening the definition of an “electronic communication service provider,” FRRA’s Section 504 could enlist coffee shops, libraries, hotels, and Airbnbs into snooping on Americans.
 
“Any entity that you visit as a customer, that provides Wi-Fi service, could be required to let the government tap into its equipment, and pull out the entire stream of communications,” Goitein told Vice’s Motherboard.
 
Many have characterized this provision as a Trojan Horse. This provision would likely result in improper collection of Americans’ domestic communications, leading to the government compelling “Upstream” access to data networks from businesses with no experience in managing the legal intricacies of communications management, or ability to filter out select communications.
 
“This is a wolf in sheep’s clothing,” the Brennan Center said in a joint statement with the Electronic Frontier Foundation about this purported “reform” legislation.

Our senior policy advisor and former U.S. Senator, Mark Udall, and general counsel, Gene Schaerr, provide insight in a letter to the editor in The Wall Street Journal.

​The House Judiciary Committee today passed the Protect Liberty and End Warrantless Surveillance Act with an overwhelmingly bipartisan vote.
 
Unlike competing proposals – such as the FISA Reform and Reauthorization Act now before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) – the Protect Liberty Act mandates a robust warrant requirement for U.S. person searches under FISA Section 702. It curtails the common government surveillance technique of “reverse targeting” – using FISA’s Section 702 authority to work backwards to target Americans without a warrant.
 
The Protect Liberty Act adopts language from the Fourth Amendment Is Not for Sale Act. This language closes the loophole that allows government agencies to buy access to Americans’ most sensitive and personal information scraped from apps and sold by data brokers.
 
The Protect Liberty Act also requires amicus participation in FISA cases to protect the public and the Constitution, ensuring that the secret FISA Court will hear from civil liberties experts as well as government attorneys.
 
And the bill would require FBI agents seeking search orders to testify to the accuracy of their reasons for bringing the search.
 
In contrast, the competing FISA Reform and Reauthorization Act emerging from HPSCI has a weak warrant requirement that would not stop the widespread practice of backdoor searches of Americans’ information. And it does not address the outrageous practice of federal agencies buying up Americans’ most sensitive and private information from data brokers.
 
The contrast between these two bills could not be starker. Ranking Member Jerry Nadler (D-NY) said the Protect Liberty Act is the only one of these two bills “that can pass on a floor vote.”
 
House Judiciary Chairman Jim Jordan says he expects a floor vote next week.
 
PPSA applauds the committee for passing this bill with such strong, bipartisan support. We are grateful to committee Chairman Jim Jordan (R-OH), Ranking Member Jerry Nadler (D-NY), Rep. Andy Biggs (R-AZ) (who introduced the bill), Rep. Sara Jacobs (D-CA), Rep. Russell Fry (R-SC), Rep. Ted Lieu (D-CA), Rep. Eli Crane (R-AZ), as well as leaders of the House Freedom Caucus and Progressive Caucus, Reps Warren Davidson (R-OH) and Rep. Pramila Jayapal (D-WA).
 
PPSA is also grateful to all the Members of the House Judiciary Committee who offered helpful amendments to strengthen the bill.
 
PPSA will follow this fast-moving story.

A report in The Wall Street Journal does a masterful job of combining graphics and text to illustrate how technology embedded in our phones and computers to serve up ads also enables government surveillance of the American citizenry.
 
The WSJ has identified and mapped out a network of brokers and advertising exchanges whose data flows from apps to Defense Department, intelligence agencies, and the FBI. The WSJ has compiled this information into several illustrative animated graphs that bring the whole scheme to life.
 
Here’s how it works: As soon as you open an ad-supported app on your phone, data from your device is recorded and transmitted to buyers. The moment before an app serves you an ad, all advertisers in the bidding process are given access to information about your device. The first information up for bids is your location, IP address, device, and browser type. Ad services also record information about your interests and develop intricate assumptions about you.
 
Many data brokers regularly sell Americans’ information to the government, where it may be used for cybersecurity, counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and public safety – or whatever a federal agency deems as such.
 
Polls show that Americans are increasingly concerned about their digital privacy but are also fatalistic and unaware about their privacy options as consumers.
 
According to a recent poll by Pew published last month, 81 percent of U.S. adults are concerned about how companies use the data they collect. Seventy-one percent are concerned about how the government uses their data, up from 64 percent in 2019. There is also an increasing feeling of helplessness: 73 percent of adults say they have little to no control over what companies do with their data, while 79 percent feel the same towards the government. The number of concerned Americans rises to 89 percent when the issue of children’s online privacy is polled. Crucially, 72 percent of Americans believe there should be more regulation governing the use of digital data.
 
Despite high levels of concern, nearly 60 percent of Americans do not read the privacy policies of apps and social media services they use. Most Americans do not have the time or legal expertise to carefully study every privacy policy they encounter. Given that one must accept these terms or not be online, it is simply impractical to expect Americans do so. Yet government agencies assert that it is acceptable to collect and review Americans’ most personal data without a warrant because we have knowingly signed away our rights.
 
There is good news. In the struggle for government surveillance reform currently taking place on Capitol Hill – and the introduction of the Protect Liberty and End Warrantless Surveillance Act – Americans are getting a better understanding of the costs of being treated as digital chattel by data brokers and government.