|
Provisions buried in the Senate Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2027 would eliminate one of the few public checks on two of the nation’s most secretive and powerful intelligence agencies. Sections 601(f) and (g) of the bill would end Senate confirmation for the general counsels of the CIA and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). PPSA joined a coalition of leading civil-liberties organizations from the left and the right to urge Congress to strike these provisions. As the coalition’s letter explains: “The general counsels of the CIA and ODNI wield extraordinary influence, and they do so entirely in secret, shaping policies on surveillance, detention, interrogation, and other highly consequential national security matters.” These officials are not merely agency lawyers handling routine questions. They help determine the legal limits of what intelligence agencies may do to Americans, including warrantless domestic spying. Yet very few CIA or ODNI officials require Senate confirmation, and much of the congressional intelligence-oversight process takes place behind closed doors. Confirmation hearings provide a rare opportunity for senators – and the American public – to examine the legal judgments, records, and commitments of officials who will exercise enormous power in secret. Then-Sen. Mark Udall (D-CO), now a PPSA Senior Policy Advisor, used the confirmation hearing of an Obama administration nominee to raise questions about the CIA’s interrogation program. Sen. Ron Wyden (D-OR) secured a commitment concerning a secret legal opinion on cybersecurity. During the Bush administration, the Senate raised concerns about nominee John Rizzo’s involvement in the CIA detention and interrogation program, leading him to withdraw his nomination. Confirmation hearings have also empowered senators to question nominees about surveillance under Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. As the letter notes, eliminating that opportunity “strips away a key safeguard and undermines the credibility of those who argue that Section 702 does not require reform because it is subject to oversight.” Secret power requires more oversight, not less. Congress should strike Sections 601(f) and (g) and preserve Senate confirmation for both general counsels. As the U.S. Senate prepares to finalize the confirmation of Jay Clayton as Director of National Intelligence, Senate Majority Leader John Thune (R-SD) scored some partisan points about the Democrats’ disdain for Acting Director Bill Pulte. The senator said: “Democrats were so worked up over the president's temporary choice for this position, they allowed our nation’s most important counterterrorism tool to go dark for the first time ever.” This was a reference to the ongoing debate – and delayed vote – on the reauthorization of Section 702, the authority under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act that allows U.S. intelligence agencies to surveil foreign threats on foreign soil, but has often been used to examine the communications of American citizens on American soil who are not suspected of any wrongdoing. It is true that the deadline for Section 702’s reauthorization has come and gone. But the important – and vital – task of surveilling foreign threats and terrorists has not stopped. All that has happened is that the authority’s statute has expired. Its surveillance programs continue to operate under court orders that allow intelligence collection to continue until March 2027. We have that much time – until the spring of next year – to debate reasonable guardrails that can curtail the program’s rampant surveillance of American citizens. There is no reason to stiff-arm all debate about reform amendments. This surveillance authority was never intended to spy on Americans when Congress enacted it to track foreign threats. Section 702 is not “dark for the first time ever.” Nor do we expect it ever to be. We have the luxury of time to hold a fulsome debate over how Section 702 is used and misused – and the best ways to improve it. The U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Chatrie v. United States settled one important question while raising another that Congress can no longer ignore. If the government needs a warrant to compel Google to disclose Americans’ location records, why should it be able to sidestep that requirement by buying the same records from a data broker? Chatrie’s Principles In a 6-3 opinion, the Court held that Americans retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in detailed cellphone location records, even when those records are held by a third party such as Google. Police therefore conduct a Fourth Amendment search when they compel disclosure of that information through a geofence warrant. In writing the majority opinion, Justice Elena Kagan recognized a simple truth about modern life: carrying a smartphone inevitably generates an extraordinarily revealing record of where we go, whom we visit, who our romantic partners are, which churches we attend, what political rallies we join, and countless other intimate details. Americans do not surrender their constitutional privacy merely because technology companies necessarily store that information. But if that is true, an obvious question follows: Why allow the federal government to simply purchase the very same information from a commercial data broker? The Data Broker Loophole Today, at least a dozen federal agencies have acknowledged buying commercially available personal data. These include the FBI, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the IRS, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Defense, and elements of the intelligence community. Instead of obtaining a warrant approved by a judge, these agencies often obtain access simply by writing a check. This practice has become known as the “data broker loophole,” a gaping privacy vulnerability that turns the Fourth Amendment inside out. Suppose police could not constitutionally enter your home without a warrant, but could legally pay your neighbor to climb through the window and photograph every room. Few Americans would believe the Constitution permits such an end-run around judicial oversight. Yet that is effectively what has developed in the digital age. Commercial data brokers aggregate astonishing quantities of personal information collected by smartphone apps, advertisers, financial transactions, connected vehicles, and countless online services. These databases can map a person’s movements, habits, religious observance, medical concerns, political associations, and relationships with extraordinary precision. Agencies can often acquire such data without ever demonstrating probable cause to a court. Now, Chatrie pokes holes through the government’s thin rationale by holding that highly revealing location histories remain constitutionally protected even when maintained by private companies. If the Constitution bars the government from compelling disclosure without a warrant, Congress should not permit agencies to obtain the same information merely because a private intermediary has placed it on the market. The bipartisan Fourth Amendment Is Not for Sale Act would close this loophole by requiring government agencies to obtain a warrant before acquiring sensitive commercially available data. The core provisions of that legislation should be incorporated into Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act when it comes up for reauthorization. The Supreme Court now recognizes that Americans possess a reasonable expectation of privacy in the digital trails their smartphones inevitably create. Congress should finish the job by closing the data-broker loophole when it reauthorizes Section 702. The government has yet to respond to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request filed in 2024 by the Cato Institute seeking records on abuses of Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Court records reveal, however, that the FBI is withholding 39,650 pages responsive to that FOIA request. This should be a matter of vital interest to Congress. Section 702 is a surveillance authority that allows the government to spy on foreign threats on foreign soil, but has been used widely in recent years to warrantlessly spy on millions of Americans whose communications are “incidentally” caught up in the National Security Agency’s global trawl. So you would think that almost 40,000 pages on possible FBI violations of Section 702 would be at the forefront of the debate over whether to add guardrails and reforms as Section 702 faces reauthorization. But Congress has been supine while the FBI promises to release only a meager 128 pages in August. The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, which could add clarity to the FBI’s actions, has also been sidelined by the administration. Patrick Eddington, a Cato fellow, wrote: “Congress is being asked to extend, without a warrant requirement, a surveillance program whose compliance record cannot be independently verified, whose oversight bodies have been deliberately disabled, and whose custodians have shown a personal willingness to turn its tools on the press.” The latter is a matter of particular concern. The previous year saw a rise in “sensitive warrantless searches,” or queries that involve political and religious figures or organizations, as well as journalists. When will Congress get curious and demand the information needed to inform the Section 702 debate? "Custom-house officers may enter our houses, when they please ... may break locks, bars, and everything in their way; whether they break through malice or revenge, no man, no court can inquire." |
Categories
All
|



RSS Feed