Project for Privacy and Surveillance Accountability (PPSA)
  • Issues
  • Solutions
  • SCORECARD
    • Congressional Scorecard Rubric
  • News
  • About
  • TAKE ACTION
    • PRESS Act
    • Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act
    • Over 3 Million Searches
  • Issues
  • Solutions
  • SCORECARD
    • Congressional Scorecard Rubric
  • News
  • About
  • TAKE ACTION
    • PRESS Act
    • Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act
    • Over 3 Million Searches

 NEWS & UPDATES

FBI and Defense Aggressively Testing Powerful Facial Recognition Systems

3/10/2023

 
Picture
​In “A Scanner Darkly,” a 2006 film based on a Philip K. Dick novel, Keanu Reeves plays a government undercover agent who must wear a “scramble suit” – a cloak that constantly alters his appearance and voice to avoid having his cover blown by ubiquitous facial recognition surveillance.
 
At the time, the phrase “ubiquitous facial recognition surveillance” was still science fiction.
 
Such surveillance now exists throughout much of the world, from Moscow, to London, to Beijing. Scramble suits do not yet exist, and sunglasses and masks won’t defeat facial recognition software (although “universal perturbation” masks sold on the internet purport to defeat facial tracking).
 
Now that companies like Clearview AI have reduced human faces to the equivalent of personal ID cards, the proliferation of cameras linked to robust facial recognition software has become a privacy nightmare. A year ago, PPSA reported on a technology industry presentation that showed how stationary cameras could follow a man, track his movements, locate people he knows, and compare all that to other data to map his social networks. Facial recognition doesn’t just show where you went and what you did: it can be a form of “social network analysis,” mapping networks of people associated by friendship, work, romance, politics, and ideology.
 
Nowhere is this capability more robust than in the People’s Republic of China, where the surveillance state has reached a level of sophistication worthy of the overused sobriquet “Orwellian.” A comprehensive net of data from a person’s devices, posts, searches, movements, and contacts tells the government of China all it needs to know about any one of 1.3 billion individuals.
 
That is why so many civil libertarians are alarmed by the responses to an ACLU Freedom of Information (FOIA) lawsuit. The Washington Post reports that government documents released in response to that FOIA lawsuit show that “FBI and Defense Department officials worked with academic researchers to refine artificial-intelligence techniques that could help in the identification or tracking of Americans without their awareness or consent.”
 
The Intelligence Advanced Research Projects agency, a research arm of the intelligence community, aimed in 2019 to increase the power of facial recognition, “scaling to support millions of subjects.” Included in this is the ability to identify faces from oblique angles, even from a half-mile away.
 
The Washington Post reports that dozens of volunteers were monitored within simulated real-world scenarios – a subway station, a hospital, a school, and an outdoor market. The faces and identities of the volunteers were captured in thousands of surveillance videos and images, some of them captured by drone. The result is an improved facial recognition search tool called Horus, which has since been offered to at least six federal agencies. An audit by the Government Accountability Office found in 2021 that 20 federal agencies, including the U.S. Post Office and the Fish and Wildlife Service, use some form of facial recognition technology.
 
In short, our government is aggressively researching facial recognition tools that are already used by the Russian and Chinese governments to conduct the mass surveillance of their peoples.
 
Nathan Wessler, deputy director of the ACLU, said that the regular use of this form of mass surveillance in ordinary scenarios would be a “nightmare scenario” that “could give the government the ability to pervasively track as many people as they want for as long as they want.”
 
As we’ve said before, one does not have to infer a malevolent intention by the government to worry about its actions. Many agency officials are desperate to catch bad guys and keep us safe. But they are nevertheless assembling, piece-by-piece, the elements of a comprehensive surveillance state.

PCLOB Testimony – Section 702 a “National Security Exception to the U.S. Constitution”

1/16/2023

 
The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) has posted a rich discussion among its board members, civil libertarians, and representatives of the intelligence community.
 
General Paul Nakasone, who heads the U.S. Cyber Command, gave the group a keynote address that is a likely harbinger of how the intelligence community will approach Congress when it seeks reauthorization of Section 702, an amendment to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act that authorizes the government to surveil foreigners, with a specific prohibition against the targeting of Americans, but also allows “incidental” surveillance of Americans.
 
Gen. Nakasone detailed cases in which would-be subway bombers and ISIS planners were disrupted because of skillful use of 702 surveillance. Mike Harrington of the FBI doubled down with a description of thwarted attacks and looming threats. April Doss, general counsel of the National Security Agency, emphasized how each request from an analyst for surveillance must be reviewed by two supervisors.
 
Civil liberties scholar Julian Sanchez reached back to the formation of the U.S. Constitution to compare today’s use of Section 702 authority to the thinking behind the Fourth Amendment. He asked if a program that mixes the private data of Americans with surveilled foreigners could possibly clear the Founders’ objection to general warrants. (31:50)
 
Jeramie Scott (40:25) of the Electronic Privacy Information Center, who argued for greater transparency in 702 collection, questioned whether “about” collection truly ended with downstream collection (i.e., information taken directly from Google, Facebook, and other social media companies). The NSA declared in 2017 it had ended the practice of such “about” collection, which moves beyond an intelligence target to email chains and people mentioned in a thread. Could such collection still be occurring in downstream surveillance?
 
Travis LeBlanc, a board member who had previously criticized a milquetoast report from PCLOB for a lack of analysis of key programs, seemed liberated by the board’s new chair, Sharon Bradford Franklin. (Chair Franklin also brings a critical eye of surveillance programs, reflecting her views at the Center for Democracy and Technology.) LeBlanc asked Julian Sanchez if the Constitution requires warrants when an individual’s data is searched under Section 702. Sanchez said that delegating such an authority under the honor system has led to FBI’s behaving as if compliance were a game of “whack-a-mole.” (57:15)
 
Cindy Cohn of the Electronic Frontier Foundation suggested PCLOB examine Section 702’s tendency to be subject to “mission creep,” such as the recent practice of using Section 702 to justify surveillance for “strategic competition” as well as the statutory purpose of anti-terrorism. Cohn said she was not aware of any defendant in a criminal trial ever getting access to Section 702 evidence. (128:45)
 
Cohn concluded:
 
“I think we have to be honest at this point that the U.S. has de facto created a national security exception to the U.S. Constitution.”
 
A revealing insight came from Jeff Kosseth, cybersecurity professor at the U.S. Naval Academy. He pointed to a paper he wrote with colleague Chris Inglis that concluded that Section 702 is “constitutional” and “absolutely essential for national security.” (See 143:40) That opinion, Kosseth added, is something he has “reconsidered” over “deep concern about the FBI’s access” to 702 data, especially concerning U.S. persons.
 
Kosseth said:
 
“At a certain point, we must stop giving the nation’s largest law enforcement agency every benefit of the doubt. The FBI cannot play fast and loose with Americans’ most private information. This has to stop now. And if the FBI cannot stop itself, the Congress has to step in.”
 
Congress needs to “step in” regardless: surveillance of Americans should never occur without express authority in a statute passed by the people’s representatives.

Is the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives Using Stingrays to Illegally Track Americans?

1/4/2023

 
Picture
In response to a Freedom of Information Act request filed by PPSA, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) responded with a batch of documents, including internal training material. In those documents, the ATF confirmed that it uses cell site simulators, commonly known as “stingrays,” to track Americans.
 
Stingrays impersonate cell towers to track mobile device users. These devices give the government the ability to conduct sweeping dragnets of the metadata, location, text messages, and other data stored by the cell phones of people within a geofenced area. Through stingrays, the government can obtain a disturbing amount of information.
 
The ATF has gone to great lengths to obfuscate their usage of stingrays, despite one official document claiming stingrays are “used on almost a daily basis in the field.”
 
The ATF stressed that stingrays are not precise location trackers like GPS, despite the plethora of information stingrays can still provide. Answers to questions from the Senate Appropriations Committee about the ATF’s usage of stingrays and license plate reader technology are entirely blacked out in the ATF documents we received. An ATF policy conceals the use of these devices from their targets, even when relevant to their legal defense. Example: When an ATF agent interviewed by a defense attorney revealed the use of the equipment, a large group email was sent out saying: "This was obviously a mistake and is being handled."
 
The information released by the ATF confirms the agency is indeed utilizing stingray technology. Although the agency attempted to minimize usage the usage of stingrays, it is clear they are being widely used against Americans.
 
PPSA will continue to track stingray usage and report forthcoming responses to pending Freedom of Information Act requests with federal agencies.

The FBI Goes Around the Fourth Amendment, Again

12/22/2022

 
Picture
​In the course of the 2020 presidential election, the FBI approached and pressured Twitter to grant the agency access to private user data. This information has come to light as part of the “Twitter Files” expose, a sprawling series of reports based on internal documents made available through Elon Musk’s ownership of the site.
 
In January of 2020, Yoel Roth, former Twitter Trust and Safety head, was pressured by the FBI to provide access to data ordinarily obtained through a search warrant. Roth had been previously approached by the FBI’s national security cyber wing in 2019 and had been asked to revise Twitter’s terms of service to grant access to the site’s data feed to a company contracted by the Bureau.
 
Roth drafted a response to the FBI, reiterating the site’s “long-standing policy prohibiting the use of our data products and APIs for surveillance and intelligence-gathering purposes, which we would not deviate from.” While Twitter would continue to be a partner to the government to combat shared threats, the company reiterated that the government must continue to “request information about Twitter users or their content […] in accordance with [the] valid legal process.”
 
Twitter and other social media platforms have been aware of increasing FBI encroachment for some time. In January of 2020, Carlos Monje Jr., former Director of Public Policy and Philanthropy at Twitter, wrote to Roth, saying “we have seen a sustained (if uncoordinated) effort by the IC [intelligence community] to push us to share more info & change our API policies. They are probing & pushing everywhere they can (including by whispering to congressional staff)...” Accordingly, from January 2020 and November 2022, over 150 emails were sent between the FBI and Roth.
 
Not only is the FBI trying to gain a backdoor into Twitter’s data stream, in several cases, the Bureau has pressured Twitter to pre-emptively censor content, opinions, and people. For example, the agency allegedly demanded that Twitter tackle election misinformation by flagging specific accounts. The FBI pointed to six accounts, four of which were ultimately terminated. One of those profiles was a notorious satire account, which calls into question the FBI’s ability to spot fakes. In November, the FBI handed Twitter a list of an additional twenty-five accounts that “may warrant additional action.” And, of course, there is the story about Hunter Biden’s laptop. According to the “Twitter Files,” the FBI pressured Twitter to censor the story as a possible Russian misinformation attack. This was a major story mere days before a presidential election, which the FBI worked to suppress.
 
Expanding efforts by the FBI to gain a backdoor into private social media information is a grave concern, as is the Bureau’s efforts to suppress information. That the agency continues to pursue such options even after being advised that those options violate normal legal procedures is yet another example of how the agency has become increasingly politicized, to the extent that a House Judiciary Committee report described the Bureau’s hierarchy as “rotted at its core” and embracing a “systemic culture of unaccountability.” This is a serious cause for concern given the widespread effects that the agency’s use and potential misuse of its authorities can have on the country as a whole.

The Shady Certification Company with Connections to Spyware

12/21/2022

 
Picture
The largest web browsers are scrutinizing their dependence on root certificate authority TrustCor Systems after researchers discovered it has links with shady spyware producers and distributors.
 
TrustCor is an agency that vouches for the legitimacy of websites reached by hundreds of millions of users every day. Web browsers employ hundreds of such root certificate authorities to fulfill a vital role in online data security. But with TrustCor Systems, malicious spyware could have had a backdoor into a critical component of U.S. internet infrastructure.
 
According to a Washington Post report on research from Joel Readon at the University of Calgary and Serge Egelman of the University of California, Berkeley, TrustCor’s “Panamanian registration records show that it has the identical slate of officers, agents and partners as a spyware maker identified this year as an affiliate of Arizona-based Packet Forensics, which public contracting records and company documents show has sold communication interception services to U.S. government agencies for more than a decade.”
 
TrustCor’s products include an email service that has been found to host spyware developed by a Panamanian company. According to The Post, Google has since banned all software containing that spyware code from its app store.
 
TrustCor also has the same president, agents, and holding-company partners listed in Panamanian records as another company known as Measurement Systems, which has been caught “paying developers to include code in a variety of innocuous apps to record and transmit users’ phone numbers, email addresses and exact locations.” Apps with that code were downloaded over “60 million times, including 10 million downloads of Muslim prayer apps.”
 
PPSA has reported how the federal government maintains an advanced surveillance network to stalk American Muslims. Who knows what they can do with these data?

FBI Almost Used Pegasus, May Be Using Similar Spyware

11/17/2022

 
Picture
In Christopher Nolan’s magnificent movie The Dark Knight, Bruce Wayne presents his chief scientist, Lucius Fox, with a sonar technology that transforms millions of cellphones into microphones and cameras. Fox surveys a bank of screens showing the private actions of people around the city.
 
The character, played by Morgan Freeman, takes it all in and then declares the surveillance to be “beautiful, unethical, dangerous … This is wrong.”
 
What was fiction in 2008 became reality a few years later with Pegasus: zero-click spyware that allows hackers to infiltrate cellphones and turn them into comprehensive spying devices, no sonar needed. A victim need not succumb to phishing. Possessing a cellphone is enough for the victim to be tracked and recorded by sound and video, as well as to expose the victim’s location history, texts, emails, images, and other communications.
 
This spyware created by the Israeli NSO Group might have originally been developed, as most of these surveillance technologies are, to catch terrorists. It has since been used by various dictatorships and cartels to hunt down dissidents, activists, and journalists, sometimes marking them for death – as it did in the cases of Jamal Khashoggi and Mexican journalist Cecilio Pineda Birto.
 
PPSA reported earlier this year that the FBI had purchased a license for Pegasus but has been keeping it locked away in a secure office in New Jersey. FBI Director Christopher Wray has assured Congress that the FBI was keeping the technology for research purposes. Now, Mark Mazzetti and Ronen Bergman of The New York Times have updated their deep dive into FBI documents and court records about Pegasus produced by a Freedom of Information Act request.
 
PPSA waded through these now-declassified documents, half of each page blanked out by censors. What we could see was alarming.
 
One document, dated Dec. 4, 2018, pledged that the U.S. government would not sell, deliver, or transfer Pegasus without written approval from the Israeli government. The letter certified that “the sole purpose of end use is for the collection of data from mobile devices for the prevention and investigation of crimes and terrorism, in compliance with privacy and national security laws.”
 
Since many in the national security arena and their allies assert that executive order EO 12333 gives intelligence agencies unlimited authority, the restraining influence of privacy and national security laws is questionable. And true to form, the FBI documents show that the agency did, in fact, give serious consideration to using Pegasus for U.S. criminal cases.
 
  • After testing Pegasus, FBI officials put together presentations that highlighted the risks and advantages of the spyware, along with the procedural and technological steps needed to operationalize it. The FBI’s Criminal Investigative Division (CID) issued a lengthy memorandum in March 2021 that advocated the use of Pegasus “under certain specific conditions.” The CID later issued proposed guidelines for prosecutors in using the spyware to prepare prosecutions.
    ​
  • On July 22, 2021, a senior official in the FBI Science and Technology Branch informed the Operational Technology Division to “cease all efforts regarding the potential use of the NSO project.” One such memo had the subject line: “FULL STOP on potential [Pegasus] use.”
 
Why the turnaround? It was at time that a critical mass of Pegasus stories – with no lack of murders, imprisonments, and political scandals – emerged in the world press. That is surely why the FBI left this hot potato in the microwave. One wonders, however, what to make of the attempt of a U.S. military contractor, L3Harris, to purchase NSO earlier this year? If the FBI was out of the picture, was this aborted acquisition an effort by the CIA to lock down NSO and its spyware menagerie? And if the CIA has found some other route to possess this technology – and to be frank, they’d be guilty of malfeasance if they didn’t – is the agency staying within its no-domestic-spying guardrails in deploying this invasive technology? Recent revelations of bulk surveillance by the CIA does not inspire confidence.
 
Nor can we discount what the FBI might do in the future. Despite the FBI’s decision to avoid using the technology, Mazzetti and Bergman report that an FBI legal brief filed in October stated: “Just because the FBI ultimately decided not to deploy the tool in support of criminal investigations does not mean it would not test, evaluate and potentially deploy other similar tools for gaining access to encrypted communications used by criminals.”
 
No doubt, targeted use of such technologies would catch many fentanyl dealers, human traffickers, and spies. But as Lucius Fox asks, “at what cost?”

UN Human Rights Report Red Flags Global Spyware Crisis

9/26/2022

 
Picture
A new report by the United Nations Human Rights Council highlights how much of a global issue spyware has become. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights calls for greater attention to threats to data privacy, to the development of state-sponsored spyware capabilities, and especially to the dangerous software Pegasus, which can remotely infiltrate smartphones and turn them into spying devices. PPSA has reported in the past on the emerging threat Pegasus poses to nations and individuals around the world. It is heartening to see the UN take this data privacy crisis seriously as a human rights issue.
 
The UN report focuses on three core trends relating to the role of member states in safeguarding and promoting the right to privacy:
 
  1. The abuse of intrusive hacking tools (“spyware”) by state authorities.
  2. The key role of robust encryption methods in protecting human rights online.
  3. The impacts of widespread digital monitoring of public spaces, both offline and online.
 
The report draws special attention to Pegasus.
 
“The extent of Pegasus spyware operations and the number of victims are staggering… Reporting in 2021 revealed that at least 189 journalists, 85 human rights defenders, over 600 politicians and government officials, including cabinet ministers, and diplomats were affected as targets.”
 
The report notes that at least 65 governments have acquired commercial spyware surveillance tools. NSO Group, the Israeli company that developed Pegasus, reported that 60 government agencies in 45 countries are among its customers.
 
The UN report states: “While purportedly being deployed for combating terrorism and crime, such spyware tools have often been used for illegitimate reasons, including to clamp down on critical or dissenting views and on those who express them, including journalists, opposition political figures and human rights defenders…”
 
The report also condemned efforts by governments to undermine the security and confidentiality of encrypted communications – a key goal not just of repressive regimes, PPSA would add, but of some in the Department of Justice and FBI.
 
Governments continue to take steps to undermine that privacy, either by legislative fiat or by sophisticated hacking techniques. In some countries, encryption providers have been required to ensure that law enforcement or other government agencies have access to all communications upon request, effectively obliterating any privacy that encryption may have provided.
 
This is a brave report. PPSA is pleased to see the UN Human Rights Council recognize privacy as a human right, contrary to the practice of repressive governments, including China and Russia, which have seats on the UN Security Council. Unfortunately, the UN’s warnings on pervasive surveillance also need to be taken seriously by democratic governments, including some in positions of authority in the United States. 

    Categories

    All
    2022 Year In Review
    Analysis
    Call To Action
    Congress
    Congressional Hearings
    Congressional Unmasking
    Court Hearings
    Court Rulings
    Digital Privacy
    Domestic Surveillance
    Facial Recognition
    FISA
    FOIA Requests
    Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act
    Government Surveillance
    Insights
    In The Media
    Lawsuits
    Legislation
    News
    Opinion
    Podcast
    PPSA Amicus Briefs
    Private Data Brokers
    SCOTUS
    SCOTUS Rulings
    Section 702
    Spyware
    Stingrays
    Surveillance Issues
    Surveillance Technology

    RSS Feed

© COPYRIGHT 2023. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. | PRIVACY STATEMENT